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Outline of a heory of Embodied Rationality
Roberta De Monticelli
Phenomenology is experiencing a new lourishing by its powerful 
contributions to the embodied / enactive approach to consciousness and 
cognition, which seems nowadays a leading paradigm in consciousness 
studies. he embodied-enactive perspective deinitely puts the perceiving 
subject back into the world, stressing the actual dynamic reciprocity 
between embodied agents and the environments with which they 
interact. Yet there is one crucial aspect of perceptual experience that 
this approach tends to neglect, namely its normative dimension. 
Now incapability to give account of normativity was the main target 
of Husserl’s (and Merleau-Ponty’s) classical criticism of scientiic 
naturalism of old. So, I take it to be an urgent task to provide for a 
phenomenological account of normativity, and one compatible with 
the embodied-enactive approach. Going the proposed path will end 
up to bridging the explanatory gap between embodied subjectivity and 
personhood, i.e. the nature of a rational agent.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty famously wanted to reconcile phenomenology 
with what he used to call the “truth of naturalism” (Merleau-Ponty 1943, 
p. 217). And so, I assume, do we—if such a thing exists.
Whatever it may be, “true” naturalism should allow for a theory of 
reality (an ontology) including at least two features that mainstream 
contemporary scientiic naturalism does not provide a satisfactory 
account for: normativity and personhood (Baker 2013, p. xiii-xxiv). 
A phenomenological approach to intentionality, as opposed to a 
naturalized one, can provide such a theory. Or so I will argue.
he embodied-enactive phenomenological view of the mind 
deinitely puts the perceiving subject back into the world, stressing 
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the actual dynamic reciprocity between embodied agents and the 
environments with which they interact. Yet there is one crucial aspect 
of perceptual and emotional experience that this approach has somehow 
neglected, namely its normative dimension (Cairman 2005, Zlatev 
2007). Outlining an overall phenomenological account of normativity, 
and one compatible with the embodied-enactive approach, seems to be 
a widely felt need within the present day phenomenological community, 
given “the structure and coniguration of our shared world, which 
is a multi-faceted normative space that allows or encourages certain 
behaviours and practices and disallows and discourages others”1.
Acts and States
In spite of a very widespread interest in enactive views of mind2, 
the notion of an act is really one of the subjects most neglected by 
contemporary philosophy. Such a notion, rightly conceived, must avoid 
two sorts of reductions, namely, a conceptual reduction of the notion 
of act to that of action, and an ontological reduction of acts to states or 
events. 
his latter reduction seems to me to be the original sin of most 
contemporary philosophy of mind, insofar as it ignores the workings 
of the subjective pole of intentionality, namely positionality. A similar 
reproach was addressed by Husserl to the psychological account of 
consciousness; not surprisingly so, given that Brentano’s concept of an 
intentional state was in the end inherited by consciousness theorists close 
to standard cognitive science, which adopts a functional perspective 
also for mental states. Mental states are what they are in virtue of the 
causal and functional role they have in our mental life, independently 
of how this role is physically implemented (Marrafa 2008, p. 38). his 
is a fundamental aspect of standard cognitive science since it is the 
cornerstone of the project of naturalizing our mental life that animates 
this paradigm. In a nutshell, the idea is to show that mental states can 
1 DoYon and BreYer, forthcoming: thanking the editors for allowing me to 
quote from the penultimate draft of their Introduction, on open access on 
Academia.edu
2 ClarK (1998), Varela, Thompson & Rosch, (1991), Gallagher (2005), 
Gallagher, ZahaVi (2008), Gallager (2012).
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be properties of the natural world studied by natural sciences (Marrafa 
2008, p. 64) and, therefore, that our mental life can be described as 
the mechanistic functioning of a mechanical device. As Fodor says, […] 
thinking can be mechanical because Turing machines are machines 
(Fodor 2001, p. 19) (italics mine).
his suggests a way to deine ontological naturalism about persons: it 
is (or is based on) the reduction of acts to states. Let’s see what a mental 
life is like, given this reduction.
 he notion of a state plays indeed a central role in the description 
of our life, whether mental or non-mental. It is common to speak of 
physical or mental states of a person. he notion mental state is the 
key notion for understanding that of mental life. In fact, according to 
a widely accepted thesis, mental life is a sequence of mental states (e.g. 
beliefs, desires, and emotions). We can therefore speak of “intentional” 
and “non-intentional” states (e.g. qualia or states of “phenomenal” 
consciousness).
he nature of a sequence of mental states is generally described either 
as (a) a low or stream, having a temporal order of succession, or (b) as 
a succession of states each of which stands in causal relations with the 
states preceding and succeeding it. he latter would be a fairly standard 
description of mental life along the lines suggested by John Searle’s 
so-called Classical Model of Practical Rationality (hereafter, CMPR). 
Consider an example:
(1) James is thirsty and believes that this is water—James decides to 
drink the water. 
According to CMPR, a decision is typically understood as a state 
(or event) which is causally determined by beliefs and desires—more 
generally, by preceding conative and cognitive states. So, this model 
incorporates a very classical form of causal determinism. Voluntary 
actions are determined by causes, exactly as any other event in nature: 
the only diference being the kind of cause: psychological causes, such as 
beliefs and desires, rather than physical or biological causes. his model 
thus involves a compatibilist account of free will resembling the standard 
empiricist line of thought going from Locke to, say, Davidson. Prima 
facie, provided that one can legitimately distinguish compulsion from 
deliberate choice, it would seem that there is no harm in describing free 
or voluntary actions as causally determined by the relevant states of belief 
  
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and desire—i.e. the sort of “psychological” or mental causes also called 
“motives” or “reasons”.
And yet, if it is described as a succession of states, a personal life does 
not obviously set itself apart from the sort of life characteristic of an 
ant—or even the “life” of a Turing Machine, which may also be deined 
as a causal succession of states. 
In response, I ofer two arguments against this description of mental 
life as a causally ordered succession of states, one phenomenological and 
one ontological. 
Actions and Events 
Phenomenologically, this description is not at all true to the life of 
persons. It fails to capture our mental life as we know it “from inside”, 
and it fails even worse to capture our grasp of other persons’ meaningful 
behaviour. Far from being a mere low of states of consciousness (which 
may be a it description of dreams), a conscious life and any span of it 
looks much more like a series of acts which are linked together, where 
the link is the relation of motivation. 
Note here that my use of “act” includes more than what is meant by 
“action” in its common philosophical sense. Let’s make an example. A 
friend comes in. I perceive her and feel joy: this response is an act. his 
joy might motivate me to break what I’m doing, run up to her, and 
hug her. But surely this joy will not motivate me to do so without my 
consent. If I were to see her while in the midst of a public talk, I would 
not endorse this desire (one more act), as I would prefer not to interrupt 
my presentation.
To cut a long story short, many mental “states” don’t seem capable 
of causing the following ones without consulting the subject, as it 
were, or, less metaphorically, without the subject’s endorsement. his 
endorsement, this stance or taking up a position (either assenting to it 
or denying it) makes an actual motive out of an otherwise merely possible 
one. Without this endorsement, that motive would not have causal 
power. 
Now, as we shall see in more detail, the endorsement of a mental 
state (assent or denial) is an instance of positionality, a “position” being 
the essential or distinctive feature of an act in a strict sense, conferring 
on it “act-uality.” 
179
      
My second line of argument against the causal theory of personal 
mental life is ontological. he phenomenological one is insuicient to 
meet analytical standards. For, without further analysis, how can we be 
sure that talk of “motive” is not a merely verbal variant of “cause”, or 
that talk of “act” is not just a verbal variant of “state”? Or, again, how 
do we know that states are not causally suicient to determine following 
states, and that endorsement is not an illusory phenomenon? How do 
we know that what appears to be so really is so, that phenomenology 
reveals ontology?
herefore, we need a) not only a phenomenological, but also an 
ontological distinction of motive from cause, and b) likewise for act and 
state.
Let’s examine the irst point. My argument presupposes that there 
is an ontological diference between actions and events. All actions are 
events, but not all events are actions. his claim is less contentious than 
the distinction between (mental) acts and (mental) states. In any case, 
I shall not argue for it further3. Let me simply illustrate this distinction 
with a seemingly clear instance of it.
Going to sleep is an action, whereas falling asleep is an event. Rather 
than being an action, falling asleep is something that happens to me. 
Suppose you accept this premise. Now suppose I am sleepy. Being 
sleepy is a good reason to go to bed. So, I may endorse this reason, thus 
consenting to my state. I am thereby determined to perform a certain 
action, namely, to go to bed. But this state is not a suicient reason. I 
might have other reasons to stay up, to resist my state of being sleepy, 
such as inishing some work, a ilm, etc. 
Now, surely, sooner or later I shall fall asleep. So—you might 
conclude—my state was after all a suicient reason, that is a cause of 
my sleeping.
Granted, it is a cause. Yet not of an action (going to sleep), but 
of an event (falling asleep). As long as we consider actions, a state by 
itself cannot give rise to an action without my endorsement, implicit or 
explicit. As soon as my state works as a cause, the action is no longer 
there, there is an event. 
herefore, a motive is diferent (ontologically) from a cause, since a 
cause does not require anybody’s assent to operate, although motives do. 
3 Runggalddier (1996).
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Let’s consider a complementary example. Slipping on a banana skin 
is an event. Getting up afterward is (inter alia) an action. No assent, no 
position-taking is necessarily involved in the event of slipping. What 
makes an action of getting up an action is the position taken, more or 
less relexively, and perhaps even without any relection at all, about the 
state in which one is thrown of balance. Recovering control and balance 
is an endorsed motive of action, hence a reason for it (not a cause). Why 
should we ignore such a blatant diference? Reducing the notion of 
action to that of event commits one to this serious oversight. 
We now go over to the second diference, that between acts and 
states. To begin with, we must clarify the notion of act—we cannot delay 
this any longer. In what immediately follows, I present a irst sketch of 
a uniied theory of acts, which should be, in my opinion, the core of an 
ontology of personhood.
Acts and Actions 
he concept of act I propose includes a subclass of actions, although 
it is not reducible to that. he box below presents a synopsis of the 
matter.
Acts in a broad sense
ACTS as a subclass of ACTIONS ACTS IN A STRICT SENSE
1. Punctual actions (as opposed to activities)
2. Actions manifesting attitudes or dispositions, possibly 
with positive or negative value (e.g., an act of friendship, 
an act of courage); possibly ritual acts (e.g., of worship, 
of faith)
3. Speech acts (doing things with words)
4. Social acts (including speech acts)
(WHAT ARE
MISLEADINGLY CALLED)
“MENTAL ACTS”
Let’s start with the cases on the left hand side. We use the term “act” 
to refer to several diferent types of actions: namely punctual ones, as 
opposed to those lasting some time, or even to activities – even if the 
diference is one of degree more than of kind. Punctual acts include, e.g., 
punching somebody, shooting a gun, pointing at something, etc. We 
also mean by “acts” actions like those included in the second subclass 
of actions in the box above. he third subclass draws our attention to 
a very important class of actions, namely, speech acts. hese are actions 
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performed by employing words. Speech acts may be required also to 
perform acts in the second subclass, such as praying. Among speech acts, 
we might be particularly interested in the assertoric ones. But we may 
also take an interest in the sort of performative acts that produce social 
institutions, like marriages, commissive acts that produce social efects 
like obligations and pretences, or directives. Most linguistic acts are also 
social acts, falling in the fourth subclass, which include acts with legal 
or political efects, etc.
But what about the right hand side of the box? 
he kinds of acts remaining are called “mental” acts. his language 
is misleading, if what is meant is a sort of “inner” or “mental” actions. 
But this is in my opinion a very confused notion. If by “mental act” one 
means “mental action”, then one must face Gilbert Ryle’s compelling 
criticism of the very idea of mental actions.
“Nobody ever says… he has performed ive quick and easy acts 
of the will, and two slow and di cult ones between breakfast and 
lunch.”4
We have to admit that this criticism is quite convincing if we imagine 
a mental act (in particular an act of the will) as a sort of inner action. 
We hardly know how to imagine it, except by the picture of a little inner 
agent, a “ghost” hidden inside our body.
But if we reject the idea of the inner agent, and regard a decision as 
the actual exercise of that ordinary disposition to make decisions called 
“our will”, Ryle’s sarcasm loses its bite: We can count decisions; we can 
say that some are di cult, other not, and so on. 
his shows that a decision is an act, but not a mental action5. Or, if 
you prefer, it shows that it is possible to call a decision an act without 
4 RYle (1949), p. 64.
5 “Was anderseits die Rede von Akten anbelangt, so darf man hier and den 
ursprünglichen Wortsinn von actus natürlich nicht mehr denken, der 
Gedanke der Betätigung muss schlechterdings ausgeschlossen bleiben” (Husserl 
(1900/ 1901), Logische Untersuchungen V, Ueber intentionale Erlebnisse 
und ihre Inhalte, §13., HUA XIX, Bd 2, S. 393. In a footnote to this 
passage Husserl approvingly quotes Natorp against “mythology” of mental 
actions and operations: „Die „Mythologie der Tätigkeiten lehnen auch wir 
ab; nicht als psychische Betätigungen, sondern als Intentionale Erlebnisse 
deinieren wir die „Akte“.“
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implying that it is a strange sort of action. On the other hand, it would 
be absurd to deny that decisions exist and that we “make” decisions.
hen what is a “mental” act? My answer is that an act is the positional 
component of a lived experience, that is, of any kind of conscious 
experience (e.g. perceptions, emotions, judgements, decisions etc.). 
“Taking a position” is a part of every intentional state—it is exactly what 
intentionality is on its subjective side. Seen a parte objecti, intentionality 
qualiies the mode of presence of something, e.g., as a perceived object or 
state of afairs, a merely imagined one, a conceived or remembered one, 
a desired or projected one, a feared or hoped for one, etc. Viewed a parte 
subjecti, intentionality qualiies the mode of responding of somebody to 
the motivating power of the present object or state of afairs—a moment 
of somebody’s actual experience. 
here is a basic form of positionality that belongs to the basic 
forms of experience, like perception and emotion. In recognition, one 
has a recognition of something being or not being there together with 
the positive or negative value it bears. Recognition is more than being 
afected by something, because it involves a claim of validity. hat is, 
it is “subject to the jurisdiction of reason.” One can ask whether it is 
right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate. Basic positionality is the 
subjective correlate of the object’s apparent existence, and of its apparent 
value-qualities: such as pleasantness or fearfulness. Apparent existence, 
apparent value qualities are characteristics that distinguish perceived and 
emotionally felt objects. he corresponding acts are not real actions, but 
basic cognitive or emotional responses: positive or negative positions 
taken in acknowledging the apparent existence of the perceived thing (or 
rejecting it as a sensory illusion), appreciating its agreeable felt character 
or shunning its scary one.
he move to avoid any reduction of mental acts either to mental 
actions or to mental states is a Husserlian move, one exceeding the 
philosophical resources of Brentano. Husserl’s suggestion was to use 
“act” as a synonym of “intentional lived experience” (intentionales 
Erlebnis), which is what Brentano, most of the time, would refer to as 
“mental phenomena”. Hence, in Husserl’s language, a state cannot be 
“intentional”, or related to an object, without being an act. 
Yet identifying acts and intentional lived experiences is not 
entirely satisfactory, because no act can be reduced to the lived or 
conscious experience of it. Acts—even “mental” acts—can transcend 
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their conscious aspects. Like anything eicacious an act is partially 
consciousness-transcendent. here is more to it than is experienced, as 
I will show shortly. My suggestion goes further: Acts in a broad sense, 
including, for instance, punctual or ritualized or social acts (such as, 
perhaps, some sort of quasi- or proto-linguistic acts such as pointing at, 
or even basic social acts like imitating), can be performed without being 
“interiorized” as conscious experiences of agency. Agency precedes and 
“grounds” intentionality or consciousness. But even positionality can 
precede consciousness.
To sum up, intentionality, or relation to an object, can be the 
property of conscious states presenting some object (as Brentano held), 
but there is no mode of presence of an object without a corresponding 
position-taking on the part of the subject. Intentionality is not only 
directedness or aboutness, but also positionality.
Basic Acts
What is ultimately the characterizing property of acts, in the strict 
sense? Following Husserl, I just claimed that this essential property is 
positionality. In other words, all intentional states involve or presuppose 
taking a position (yes‑no) relative to an object (in a large sense: including a 
value, a project, its goal, etc.). Strictly speaking, acts are positional states. 
Positionality is to the subject of an intentional relation what the mode 
of presentation is to its object. It is the way in which the subjective pole 
of an intentional state is constituted: i.e., the way in which it experiences 
itself as such, as a subject. 
All acts—“mental” or not, narrowly or broadly conceived, hence 
including actions—are responses to the environment or surrounding 
world. Some responses are positions. Taking up a position, a stance, 
relative to a given object and a corresponding state, is a necessary 
feature of intentional states. Positionality is the speciic property of what 
Husserl calls “intentional lived experiences”, along with a presentation of 
some object. Without positionality, we only have mental states. A state 
involving a position is an act. I must show this in greater detail. To do 
so, let me propose an outline for a hierarchy of acts.
he basic level of our entire personal life is comprised of what we 
may call basic acts, containing irst order positions. 
  
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here are two classes of such basic acts, cognitive and emotional, or, 
to put it slightly diferently, perceptions and emotions. Basic cognitive 
acts or perceptions are characterized by irst order “doxic” positionality, 
while basic emotional acts feature “axiological” positionality. 
What I call doxic positionality (doxa, Greek for “belief ”) consists in 
recognizing a perceived thing’s existence. It is a kind of assent or denial, 
and it is not a relective (or a propositional belief ) but an immediate one. 
It’s not a “judgment”, if we mean by that the illocutionary act employing 
a symbolic representation of an object or a state of afairs. It’s the naïve 
realist or “natural” attitude toward reality. A perception can turn out to 
be a delusion. It could not, if there were no doxic position, like in an 
act of imagination or day-dreaming (where no question of truthfulness 
is relevant). A doxic position is the subjective counterpart to the claim of 
veridicality that distinguishes perceptions. 
What I call axiological positionality (from axios, the Greek word for 
“worth” or “valuable”) acknowledges the positive or negative salience, 
or value, of a given thing or situation. Each emotion includes such 
a position. hey can be appropriate. But they can also turn out to 
be inappropriate—imagine, e.g., sufering panic when faced with a 
peaceful little cat. he negative axiological position of the corresponding 
experience is in that case wrong. 
First level positions are not freely taken. I cannot avoid endorsing the 
existence of what I see or touch. I cannot take up an opposite position 
than the one of negative value I in fact adopt concerning an object of 
fear or horror. hat holds even in the instance that a thing’s existence 
turns out in the further course of experience to be illusory (something 
perceived as a living thing turns out to be a scarecrow), or in the 
instance that a feared object turns out not to be so bad after all. For 
this to happen – for the position to be modiied into a “crossing of”, a 
modality of perceptual doubt, or, in short, a new position – there must 
be an antecedent position.
Positionality and Normativity
What is the role of positionality in basic experience? In other words, 
why should we consider acts and not states to be our basic form of 
experience? It should be clear by now. Only positionality is responsible 
for adequacy or inadequacy of perceptions and emotions. We may see this 
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better by contrasting perceptions and emotions with acts of imagination: 
which essentially don’t have any claim of truthfulness (or not in this basic 
sense), don’t raise any doubt about their adequacy, and which typically 
have a “neutralized” positionality (in Husserl’s terminology).
Ordinary perceptions and emotions, on the other hand, are 
corrigible. A claim of validity can be cancelled by a modiied position 
(perplexity, doubt, rejection, for instance).
Hence, if by “experience” we mean not just the causal impact 
of external reality on an organism, but something we can learn from, 
something which is or is not veridical or appropriate, something which 
can provide evidence for our judgments of fact and value, then we must 
take positionality into account.
In summary, the diference between acts and states is the diference 
between experience as evidence for (possible) true statements (of fact or 
value) and experience as causal impact of reality on an organism. But the 
experience through which we explore the world, the experience we “learn 
from”, is of the irst kind. It is always more or less adequate—and could 
not be such without positionality. As a inal statement concerning this 
distinction between acts and states, we may say that states are merely the 
efects of the world’s causal impact on an organism, whereas (basic) acts 
are adequate or inadequate responses to reality. Hence, positionality is the 
foundation of normativity.
A hierarchy of acts. Personhood defined 
By adequacy I mean rational adequacy, in a broad, both cognitive 
and practical, sense. he present section presents a conception of 
personhood in terms of a theory of acts. 
I shall irst state the three claims I would like to argue for:
(A) To live as a person is to emerge on one’s states by one’s acts.
(S) A person is a subject of acts.
(F) A certain subset of acts is a necessary condition for the 
emergence of a personality, and it is the set of free acts
Notice that propositions (A), (S), and (F) contain several notions, i.e., 
act, subject of acts, free acts, emergence, that deserve further clariication.
In the rest of this section I shall try to provide some support for (A). 
I shall also sketch a line of argument for the other claims. hesis (S) and 
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thesis (F) are, in fact, respectively, a corollary and a speciic instance of 
thesis (A). 
Personal life as a life of reason starts with basic, pre-relective acts. Or, 
we could also say that basic acts constitute the irst level of the emergence 
of a person on her states, meaning by that that subjectivity is constituted, 
or irst experienced as such, in the pulse of basic positionality. his is the 
level of pre-relective recognition of a factually and axiologically qualiied 
reality.
Let’s now examine the irst claim:
(A) To be a person is to emerge on one’s states by one’s acts.
A person is a subject that “emerges” from a temporal sequence of 
biological and mental states by virtue of the positional component of 
perceptions, emotions and behaviour subject to normativity (right or 
wrong). Such basic pre-relective, normativity-driven experience may 
be contrasted with behaviour simply adaptive, or biologically driven 
(satisfaction of needs, etc.). 
One might wonder what it is for experience to be “normativity 
driven”. his is a crucial point for a correct understanding of our 
notions of emergence and subject: a low of psychological states through 
which an animal – let’s say, a dog, a dauphin, a chimpanzee—interacts 
with its natural and social environment is no suicient condition for 
these states to be acts of a subject. Positionality—even and particularly 
pre-relective, non propositional positionality—is taking up positions 
relative to factual and axiological data; subject to be modiied when they 
are felt as wrong. What to do with them, what to do next: right or wrong 
behaviour, is what we irst learn by sharing the habits and norms of the 
life-community we are born in. 
Maybe social learning is part of the becoming adult of (some) non-
human animals; what seems to be characteristic of humans, though, 
is cultural or norm-based learning, typically requiring coherence, 
organization and order in even the most basic responses to the 
environment, so that “meaningful” structures of behaviour can gradually 
emerge from pretty unorganized sequences of reactions to inner and 
outer stimuli. Reinforcing right responses, discouraging wrong ones, 
co-executing right positions: this is how the care-givers and their 
community provide the foundations of an emerging subjectivity. A form 
of collective intentionality which the human infant takes part in – as 
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Max Scheler irst pointed out—is the condition of the infant’s emerging 
as a subject of a motivational chain of acts, out of a mere low of states. 
We may then specify (A) as follows:
(A') Basic acts are the irst level of persons’ emergence on states 
the level of (basic) recognition of a factually and axiologically 
qualiied reality.
In fact, it is by means of basic acts that we get in touch with objective 
reality and do so in its factual and axiological aspects. (hat is, we 
experience reality as objective, and not just as what resists our drives).
But we can do more. We can also manage the states in which this 
contact with reality puts us. In basic acts, I said, we experience reality 
as objective. We can get it wrong. But even if we get it right, the use we 
make of data is (within certain limits) up to us. It is in our power to 
expose ourselves more or less to reality, that is to accept or reject data as 
motives of further life (experiences, actions). 
his observation leads us to a consideration of what we may call 
second-level emergence involved in the management of states. We 
manage our states by a second class of acts, involving second level 
positions, that is, positions that we take up relative to the basic acts 
and their objective and subjective correlates (states of afairs and mental 
states).
hese “managing acts” are, in a broad sense, free (as above, “free 
acts” is a shortening for the more natural “freely undertaken acts”). In 
fact, a irst-level act of denying reality to what I perceive as real is not 
in my power (perception is not a free act, nor is belief ), yet refusing 
motivational weight to a perceived fact (or salience) is in my power.
I can receive a piece of bad news, or learn about a very painful fact, 
and I can also let myself be motivated by it. But I can also “repress” it, 
not in a irst-level position, but in a second-level act of not allowing 
it to motivate my further acts, e.g., my emotions, thought, decisions, 
or behaviour. I “neutralize” the irst-level position. With this act I can 
manage my states by regulating my exposure to further experience.
To endorse or ignore basic inputs is to take up a second‑level position. 
Second-level positions characterize free acts in a broad sense.
With the phrase “in a broad sense” I mean to emphasize a typical 
character of this second class of acts. hey are not necessarily conscious, 
or entirely conscious. We can manage our passivity in the darkness, as 
it were, like in the example of repressing a grief, thereby blocking all 
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working-through of a bereavement—without admitting doing that, even 
before oneself.
As a concluding remark for this section, we can make a further 
speciication concerning (A):
(A'') By virtue of second-level positions, acts that are free in a broad 
sense bring about a second level of persons’ emergence upon 
states, i.e. the level of managing one’s exposure to further 
experience.
The Emergence of Personal Identity
In order to see the proper character of the third and inal class of acts, 
we might think of the just-discussed second-level emergence of acts and 
persons as the management of one’s passivity. his paradoxical-sounding 
expression reminds us that experience is never completely “passive”. 
Otherwise we could not even say that we “grow up” through experience. 
Yet the “path” that each one of us takes through the world, so to speak, 
by managing passive motivations and conditioning their inluence 
on further experience need not be a series of choices, conscious or 
otherwise. No doubt personality and character traits express themselves 
in second-level acts. hey can always be clariied in retrospect, and 
alternative possible plots can be brought to consciousness, although that 
is not necessary. On the other hand, by regulating our exposure to the 
low of information coming through the basic acts, we undeniably exert 
a power of some sort, attesting an eicacy entirely absent in basic acts. 
We do choose whether or not to authorise the motivational force of a 
given experience on further experience.
Further experience, though, does not necessarily mean further action. 
By saying yes or no, as it were, to data and states as motives in our ongoing 
life, we do not necessarily engage in active behavior. Avoiding to work 
through bereavement, for example, is no active behavior. Fully conscious 
motive management concerns only a particular subclass of free acts 
which are in fact authorizations to proceed, or licences to make something 
of the data of a given experience. And, hence, we give ourselves licence to 
make something out of ourselves. Here we come to those acts which we 
may deem free in the strict sense. 
hose acts in which we endorse (or ignore) a datum (or state) as a 
reason for action are acts that are free in the strict sense.
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hese acts are essentially commitments to one’s future behavior. 
What characterizes this class is that with the second-level positions 
endorsing or repudiating data or states as reasons for action we impose 
on ourselves an obligation of sorts with respect to ourselves or other 
persons. Decisions are paradigmatic instances of the former, promises of 
the latter. 
Acts that are free in the strict sense are what we may call self‑
constitutive acts. By endorsing a reason for action, I take a commitment 
toward my future self. I accept responsibility for what I shall be. In 
this sense we may say that decisions are paradigmatic instances of self-
constitutive acts, even if we might, by further analysis, discover that the 
essential nature of a decision is better clariied by analyzing it as a sort of 
promise made to oneself. hat is, a decision really engages one’s future 
self, or, conversely, one bears responsibility for one’s past decisions only 
in so far as one is actually responsive to other people’s expectations. 
We may in fact discover, as Nietzsche was the irst to suggest, that 
personal responsibility is genealogically linked to social acts of promising 
before being the amazing power of self-obligation that we attribute to 
our (free) will. Yet, questions of origin, as opposed to question of essence 
or structure, need not bother us here. 
While decisions can be mute acts, promises are paradigmatic 
instances not just of social acts, but also of linguistically grounded 
social acts. Now, most speech acts are self-committing acts, as Searle 
rightly observed. By making assertions I commit myself to sincerity 
and justiication, by making directive or commissive acts I may also 
bind myself to bear responsibility for other people’s actions or take on 
obligations towards other people. To enlarge our perspective beyond 
speech acts of the familiar varieties, consider further how by an act of 
faith I might commit myself to a spiritual path, or how by making a 
political choice I might adopt a coherent set of opinions, etc. 
Further inquiry might in fact show that the very possibility of an 
act of the will, namely an explicit decision, presupposes a capability for 
all sorts of voluntary (or free) acts (actions), such as the just-mentioned 
speech acts, and more generally our everyday linguistic practice, i.e., our 
ordinary practice of doing things with words, like reassuring friends, 
instructing children, exchanging goods, and so on. here is a suggestion 
concealed in this hint, namely, that the old notion of will should be 
explained as the faculty of choices and descriptively analyzed as a higher 
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order capacity of managing the class of self-constitutive acts. Because it 
is an assessment of oneself in a more or less resolute act of endorsing or 
rejecting a certain course of action (“Yes, I will—yes, that’s the person 
I am”), a choice turns out to be an act involving a position of the third 
level, namely, an accepting or rejecting other acts involving second-level 
positions (acts that are strictly free or voluntary). here actually is a 
relective component to any conscious choice indeed, whether or not it 
is deliberate—whereas a voluntary action can be habitual, or anyhow 
brought about without relection. 
Let’s sum up the result of the preceding analysis:
(A''') Acts that are free in a strict sense, or self-constitutive acts, 
constitute a third level of emergence of a person’s on her 
states, namely, the level of managing one’s actions. his level 
is a person’s peculiarly temporal emergence on her present state 
(projecting, planning).
he last clause is in need of some explanation. “Temporal emergence” 
refers to one’s assuming responsibility for one’s past and one’s future, 
precisely as the same self through time. 
Let’s now recall thesis (F): 
(F) here is a subset of acts needed for emergence of a personal 
identity, and it is the set of free acts.
Now we can be more precise:
(F') Personality emerges upon states in acts that are free in a 
broad sense, in this way intrinsically characterizing human 
persons, e.g. in terms of motivational style and the contents of 
experience. 
(F'') Personal identity through time emerges in acts that are free 
in the strict sense (self-constitutive acts), which are also acts 
in which one becomes actually responsible for one’s past and 
present self.
My contention is therefore that a full-blown person is a being capable 
of self-constitutive acts. Humans are normally capable of becoming full-
blown persons, when the relevant biological and social pre-conditions 
are fulilled. 
I shall express this point by my claim (S):
(S) A person is (essentially) a subject of acts 
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he idea is that personal subjectivity is primarily a capacity for 
acts of all types. Further, being a subject is a necessary condition for 
having a subjective point of view, i.e. a irst-person perspective. In other 
words, self-consciousness presupposes subjectivity as the capacity of 
meaningful, structured or “normal” behavior. You must be a subject, 
and live as a subject, in order to recognize yourself as a subject, which 
comes about, among other things, by acquiring a (linguistically and 
conceptually articulated) irst-person perspective.
Note that the notion of a subject is not presupposed but rather 
explained by the notion of an act. Human life does not reduce without 
remainder to being a (personal) subject. Digestion, for instance, does 
not, while eating and (even more so) sexuality do.
In short: 
(S') Only a being capable of acts is a subject and can acquire a 
(robust) irst-person perspective (relective, articulated self-
consciousness).
Let’s now examine the relation between personhood and subjectivity 
in more detail. Do the diferent levels of acts somehow correspond to 
degrees of development too? It seems to me that all we can say, on the 
basis of the foregoing analysis, is the following:
(S'') A capacity for basic acts is a necessary (but not suicient) 
condition for the emergence of a person.
(S''') A capacity for free acts is a necessary and suicient condition 
for the emergence of a person.
hat is, a capacity for free acts is a necessary and suicient condition 
for acquiring both a (relexive, articulated) irst-person perspective and 
personal identity. 
his perspective marks a discontinuity between what we may call 
a “potential person” and other animals, a discontinuity related to our 
capacity to acquire mastery of language. Such mastery consists not only 
of grammatical and semantic competence, but also of a capacity for 
appropriate speech acts, and, more generally, acts of symbolic expression. 
Let’s consider this last claim more closely. he irst level of 
emergence—recognition of qualiied reality in perception and emotion—
seems to reveal itself as “having always been there” only in case language 
and propositional thinking or other symbolic thinking can be acquired. 
In fact, as we saw, perceiving reality as objective and expressive of value-
qualities (rather than encountering it as something resisting our drives) 
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is a faculty whose importance we realize, in a way, when it provides 
evidence for judgments, or acts of symbolic expression (e.g., think of the 
marvelous Altamira’s caves), even if basic acts can be there without these 
capacities having yet developed. 
To recapitulate the main steps of my analysis, we can say that without 
basic acts one cannot learn from experience, or enjoy life as experience. 
Only by managing that life do we emerge from it and in a way rise 
above it as (active) subjects of our lives. But only self-constitutive or self-
committing acts are sources of personal identity through time.
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